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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

court noted without a court-imposed requirement, nothing prevented
Akron from decreasing its water release.
In conclusion, the court upheld the trial court's interpretation of
the 1911 statute, reversed the trial court's judgment regarding the W.S.
Kent deed, which granted full riparian rights to Akron, and vacated the
trial court's judgment regarding public access to Lake Rockwell. The
court remanded the case to the trial court to render judgment in favor
of Akron on the Lake Rockwell public access issue and to make a declaration in favor of Portage as to Akron's water release requirement.
Lynn Noesner
SOUTH CAROLINA
White's Mill Colony, Inc. v. Williams, 609 S.E.2d 811 (S.C. Ct. App.
2005) (adopting the common law rule regarding who controls the surface of private, man-made, and non-navigable waters).
The South Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed a special referee
decision denying Williams and other adjacent landowners both public
and private access rights to White's Mill Pond. The pond is a manmade, essentially isolated body of water. White's Mill Colony ("Colony") held tide to the land north and east of the pond and at least a
substantial portion of the bed of the pond itself. The Colony brought
suit against Williams and other adjacent landowners seeking exclusive
use of the pond and damages for trespass onto the Colony's land.
The court first addressed whether the adjacent landowners had a
right of public access to the pond. The South Carolina Constitution
made all navigable waters of the state public highways, and guaranteed
a public right of access. Navigable waters included any waterway with
the capacity to support valuable floatage. Also, the waterway needed to
connect to other navigable bodies of water so collectively they formed a
means of transportation. The court found no evidence in the record
that the pond served any useful purpose for transportation, and the
streams flowing in and out of the pond were not capable of supporting
valuable floatage. The court concluded the pond was not a navigable
waterway and, therefore, no right of public access existed.
Next, the court addressed whether the adjacent landowners had a
private right of access to the pond, or littoral rights, since they lived
next to the pond. Under common law, landowners next to a body of
water possessed property rights that allowed them to make reasonable
use of the water for any lawful purpose. However, this case dealt with
rights to a private, man-made, and non-navigable pond owned almost
entirely by an adjoining landowner. The court acknowledged two
views on the rights of adjacent landowners in this situation emerged.
The common law rule entided the owner of the land underlying the
surface water to exclusive control of the water. The owner of the underlying land had the right to exclude all others from accessing or us-
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ing the water. The civil law rule entitled the adjacent landowners to
reasonable use and enjoyment of the body of water whether navigable
or not. The court followed the common law rule because South Carolina water law closely followed common law rules. Also, the court
noted the policy protecting landowners who made improvements on
their property was in accord with the general jurisprudence of the
state.
Therefore, the court affirmed the special referee's order that the
Colony had the exclusive right to use the pond to the extent they
owned the land underlying the pond in fee simple. The court's determination of who had rights to use the pond depended on who held
tide to land underlying the pond, which the special referee had not
determined when he awarded trespass damages. Therefore, the court
remanded the case for a determination of exact property boundaries
and damages.
HeatherHeinlein
SOUTH DAKOTA
Sorensen v. Sommervold, 694 N.W.2d 266 (S.D. 2005) (holding a
county has a general duty to improve roads in a manner that permits
surface waters to escape through their natural course to prevent flooding to a property owner's land).
Linda and Nels Sorensen ("Sorensens") own property on both
sides of a road that Clay County, South Dakota ("County") recently
modified by replacing a "T" intersection with a curved road. The
Sorensens claimed that the intersection previously had a twenty-four
inch culvert ("culvert") that allowed water to continue in the natural
course of drainage, and that the new road intersected the general
course of natural drainage. The Sorensens requested the County reinstall the culvert and alleged the County's refusal to do so caused flooding and irreparable damage to their land.
Following the County's denial to reinstall the culvert, the Sorensens applied for a writ of mandamus in the FirstJudicial Circuit Court,
Clay County, requesting an order to compel the County to reinstall the
culvert. The County moved for judgment on the pleadings and moved
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the
County's motions and the Sorensens appealed to the South Dakota
Supreme Court.
The County admitted that South Dakota statutes imposed a duty on
counties to maintain roads and culverts, but asserted that the manner
in which the County performed this duty was within the discretion of
the County and was not subject to mandamus relief. The County also
denied that the modified road prevented drainage.
The court stated that a township's duty with respect to natural
drainage was specific and that South Dakota law required authorities to

